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THEORY OF BANK LENDING WITH MONITORING AND 





We present a model in Costly State Verification framework that 
relates capital raised in a firm to profitability. We explain how 
optimality of investment is affected by how the aggregate funding 
affects the expected outcomes of the project. Although we find 
underinvestment, the problem does not get severe with increasing 
dead weight costs.  
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1.  Introduction  
 
   A common feature underlying the emerging markets is the reforms 
governing the banks and the other financial intermediaries. E.g., in 
India, regulations governing the banking sector  require banks and 
other financial institutions to operate in a more competitive 
framework. These regulations were carried out broadly, in two 
phases. It started with the Debt Recovery Tribunal, set up in 1993. 
An important question to be asked is whether emerging economies 
exhibit more risk taking. The answer to this question lies in finding 
out the likely departure from optimal investment. In other words, are 
emerging markets characterized by underinvestment or 
overinvestment.  
 
   We model a simple firm  -  bank relationship in a costly state 
verification framework (Moore 1993). Yafeh and Yosha (1996) find 
empirical support to the above. In these models, the lenders monitor 
the firm in `bad states'. Monitoring in our model is equivalent to a 
commitment by the lenders (the banks) to verify or audit the 
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realization reported by the borrower. The lender audits the firm to 
prevent the later to undertake  strategic default  (Bolton and 
Scharfstein,1995). The basic structure of our model is as follows:  
The firm has a project with uncertain returns. The funds raised to 
undertake the project affects the probability of success.  This is the 
main difference in our model with  the other papers in the literature.  
In most papers, investments made by the different agents do n ot 
affect the incentives for each other to invest. However, in our model, 
we find that the investment by the bank and the firm, is 
interdependent. The total capital raised by the firm affects the  
probability of success. Higher is the investment made, higher is  the 
probability  that the project succeeds. 
 
   Occurrence of underinvestment with costly monitoring is common 
in the literature-  Gale and Hellwig (1985), Mukherji and Nagarajan 
(1995), Biais and Casamatta (1999). In these papers,  CSV 
framework leads to underinvestment with the standard debt contract. 
The reason being, with costly monitoring to encounter the moral 
hazard problems, the cost per unit of lending increases. Thus,  credit 
rationing occurs,  thereby reducing the aggregate investment in the 
project. The frameworks mentioned above differ slightly with each 
other. However, we obtain that costly monitoring may lead to both 
underinvestment as well as overinvestment. This is because, 
investment by the bank and the firm complement each other. In a 
recent paper, Mukhopadhyay (2002) reports overinvestment in a 
framework similar to ours. Our results relating to the capital structure 
problem confirms some of the existing empirical findings. A 
significant work has already been done explaining optimal  and/or 
observed leverage ratios across economies.
1 Borio (1990) compares 
the capital structure of the G -7 countries and conclude that 
companies in Japan and Continental Europe are more highly levered 
than the Anglo-American companies. The reason behind this, he 
attributes, is the financial structure and systems prevailing in these 
countries. Similar findings are reported in Berglof (1990). The 
reasons again are, the financial systems prevailing in these countries. 
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He asserts that while financing in countries like Japan, Germany, 
France and Italy are `bank oriented', in USA, UK and Canada, 
financing is more `market oriented'. Demigurc and Levine (1996) 
compare the debt equity ratios across various developing and 
developed nations. They   conclude that the more developed the 
stock markets, higher are the debt equity ratios.  This, is despite of 
the fact that an improved stock market induces a firm to have more 
equity. They conclude, that `Firms in countries with underdeveloped 
stock markets first increase their debt equity ratios as their stock 
markets develop and subsequently lower it.' Our model corroborates 
the above findings. 
 
   In section 2 we propose the basic model In section 3, the 
equilibrium is calculated. Section 4 presents the optimality results 
while section 5 concludes the paper.  
2. The Model 
 
   We consider a simple environment where the economy consists of 
only two sets of agents, an entrepreneur/ firm  F  and a bank  B.
2 
The firm owns a project that requires input  today to  produce output 
of  v tomorrow. The input,  X  denotes the aggregate investment in 
the project provided by the bank and the firm. The project realization 
is  }, , 0 { V v =  where  ¥ < <V 0 .  
Capital is raised either through debt, equity or any combination of 
both. It is not mandatory for the firm to seek outside finance as we 
do not assume any funds constraint for the firm. The  total 
investment in the project can be viewed as the fund required to 
purchase  machinery, technology, improved  human resources etc.  
This means that  better the quality  of these resources,  acquired by 
more investments, higher is  the probability  that the project 
succeeds.  
Denote  B X  and  F X  as the investments by the bank and the firm 
respectively with   . X , X F B 0 ‡  Therefore,  . X X X F B + =  The 
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costs of raising these  funds are  B B X . r ) X ( r =  for the bank and 
F F X . q ) X ( q =  for the firm. We shall assume the following about 
the costs, 
A.1:  . r q 0 > >  The costs of raising funds for both the parties are 
assumed to be linear functions. Further, it is assumed that the bank 
can raise funds at a lower cost than the firm. This assumption is not 
unreasonable, given that the bank can raise funds at a low cost 
because of its depositors. We denote  p as the probability of  V  
occurring.
3 Let  ) X ( p  be the probability of success. We assume the 
following about  ) X ( p . 
A.2:  X e ) X ( p - - =1 .  Therefore, the  probability of success is, 
increasing and concave in  . X  The entrepreneur can finance the 
project in any of the following three ways.  Firstly, she can finance 
the project entirely through equity, implying F X X = . The project is 
successful with a probability of  ) X ( p F . In this case, the firm 
retains the entire cash flow.  The second mode of financing is 
entirely by debt financing. The firm can finance the project by 
borrowing an amount   B X  from the bank without contributing any 
amount herself. The bank will lend  B X X =  in return for a return 
(claim) of  R from the project. The firm retains the residual  R V -  
amount. Finally, the firm may contribute  F X  as equity while 
borrowing  B X  from the bank. In this case, the project succeeds with 
a probability of  ). X X ( p F B +  
 
   There are three stages. In the first stage, the firm decides whether 
or not to borrow from the bank. In case, she decides not to borrow, 
the project is entirely equity financed. If she decides to borrow, she 
decides the face value of debt.  In the second stage, if the firm 
borrows from the bank, the investment decisions by the firm and the 
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bank is taken.  In the final stage, the actual realization takes place 
and the project cash flows are distributed 
among the firm and the bank, with debt having senior claims over 
equity. 
 
   Denote  0 P  as the maximum profit to the firm when she does not 
seek outside financing. The total investment in the project in this 
case is denoted by  0 X .  Note from assumptions A.1 and A.2, 
q
V ln X = 0 , where ln  denotes the natural logarithm. Thus,  
    
q
V
ln . q q V - - = 0 P …..               ……        (1) 
An important feature of our model is that, in order to undertake the 
project, external funding is not compulsory. The firm will borrow 





   We now consider debt financing. The bank incurs two kinds of 
costs. Apart from the capital cost, the bank also incurs an auditing 
cost. As in Moore (1993), Mukhopadhyay (2002) and others, the 
lenders have to incur a fixed auditing cost,  q , whenever the firm 
defaults on her debt repayments. By incurring this cost, the lenders 
can observe the actual realization of the project. We implicitly 
assume two things. One, the  auditing technology is perfect, i.e., once 
this cost is incurred, the lending institution knows the true realization 
accurately and two, the banks monitor whenever the firm defaults.
4 
In the event that the firm does not default, the lenders do not audit.
5  
                                                                 
4 These two assumptions together rules out strategic defaults as in Bolton 
and Scharfstein (1995). Strategic default occurs when the money available 
to the debtor is sufficient to pay the creditors, but is not paid.  
5 One can alternately, model the auditing choice of the bank as a stochastic 
variable. Modeling stochastic auditing does not alter our results.  
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   Denote  F B,P P    as the expected profits to the bank and the firm 
respectively, when both parties invest in the project.  
 
B F B F B B X . r )] X X ( p [ R ). X X ( p - + - - + = q P 1           (2) 
F F B F X . q ) R V ).( X X ( p - - + = P                                        (3) 
 
   With a probability of  ) X ( p  the project succeeds and the bank 
gets R.   With a probability of   ) X ( p - 1  the project   returns are 
zero. In order to prevent strategic default, the bank has   to incur q  
whenever  . v 0 =   
  We solve stage II first where, given  the choice of  R by the firm, 
the bank and the firm chooses  *
B X  and  *
F X  respectively. Finally, 
we solve for  * R  given the optimal values of  *
B X  and  *
F X  . The 
bank operates in a competitive scenario. In other words,  they earn 
zero supernormal profits. Therefore,  *
B X  satisfies, 
     0 . )] ( 1 [ ). (
* * * * * = - + - - + B F B F B X r X X p R X X p q               (4) 
The firm chooses  *
F X  to maximize profits. Therefore,  
           . q ) R V )( X X ( p *
F
*
B = - + ¢                                                (5) 
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B 0 = $ 0 _ = B I by  . 0 = B I . Note that, if  *
B X is not  positive, then 
the firm will not borrow from the bank.  
In 
￿ ￿V
0  R R R R V - q  z  
X
X
Face value of 
X
Investments by the 
Agents International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.2-2(2005) 
  92 
 Figure 1 plots the investment levels of the bank and the firm against 
the debt claims.  The bank invests positive amounts in the project if 
and only if  the debt is both bounded from below and above. The 
lending function of the bank  is concave. The investment by the bank 
is highest when,  ( ). V ( q V R R max q + - = =  While it is easy to 
appreciate why investment by the bank, initially increases with a rise 
in  R, the reason for its fall as  R increases beyond  max R is not 
obvious. As R increases, the investment by the firm reduces. This is 
because, higher face value of debt reduces the residual claims of the 
firm. 
Note, from equation (6), the aggregate investment in the project 
reduces as  R increases. The lower aggregate investment makes the 
project riskier. The bank responds to this by lowering its 
investment.The negative relationship between the debt claims and 
the bank's investment is similar to the  credit rationing results 
obtained in Gale and Hellwig (1985). However, the driving force 
behind those results were the role of monitoring costs. These costs, 
being dead weight in nature reduces the lenders investment. Credit 
rationing in our model occurs because, lower equity financing makes 
the project riskier. The second interesting observation pertains to the 
relationship between the auditing cost and the face value of debt. We 
observe that an increase in q  decreases  * R .  This happens because, 
ceteris paribus, higher auditing costs imply that the bank lower its 
investment. Therefore, the firm reduces R*.  
 
Result 1: In equilibrium,  . R R max * £   
Proof: From the expressions of  max * R , R  note that at 
. R R , r max * = =0  Now consider, the expression for  . R*  It is 
straight forward to show that  * R is decreasing in  . r  This follows 






￿ - - + + r ) r q )( V ( r q 4 2  is 
increasing in  , r   r q -  is decreasing in  . r  This completes the proof. 
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The above result throws up an interesting observation. With both 
parties being risk neutral, and with the firm having higher cost of 
capital than the bank, it appears that the firm should squeeze 
maximum investment from the bank. However, the above result 
indicates that the firm typically settles for a lower investment from 
the bank than that it could have got. This is because, lower debt 
increases the residual claim of the firm. The next result relates the 
debt level to aggregate investment in the project. 
 
Result 2: Ceteris paribus, the bank's investment, increases if either-
(a)  the monitoring cost, q  decreases;  or (b)  the capital cost of 
bank,  r  decreases; or (c) the capital cost of the firm, q increases.  
Proof: Note that  * R   decreases as either  q  or  r  increases. As 
, R R max * £  concavity of  B X  implies that an increase in  * R  will 
lead to an increase in  *
B X .  Therefore, an increase q  or r   which 
affects  * R  adversely, will also  affect  *
B X  adversely. Part  (c) can 
be established from the fact that an increase in qleads to an increase 
in  * R . ￿ 
 
   The above findings are not surprising. The negative impact of q  
and  r   on X*B  is expected. However, part (c) of the proposition is 
interesting. A reduction in equity capital without accompanied by 
any other measure would reduce the success probability enormously. 
In order to prevent this from happening, the firm increases the face 
value of debt. In increase in debt, leads to an increase in the bank's 
funding.  
 
The final result in this section relates the equilibrium aggregate 
investment to the various parameters.  
 
Result 3: Ceteris paribus, the aggregate investment,  * X  increases if  
either- (a) the capital cost of the bank  decreases, or (b) the 
monitoring cost of the bank increases, or (c) the capital cost of the 
firm decreases.  International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.2-2(2005) 
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Proof: Part (a) and (b) follow from the fact that  * R  increases as, 
either q  or r   decreases. For the proof of (c), note that  
( )
) r q (
r ) r q )( V ( r










 Denote,  ). r q )( V ( ) V ( G - + ” q  Therefore,  
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Part (b) of the above result is particularly interesting. With a high q , 
the claim of the bank on the project is lower. This implies that the 
residual claim of the firm in the project is very high. A high  q  
curtails the bank's investment but increases the firm's investment. 
The increase in investment by the firm is more than  the bank's 
reduction in investment. 
 
4. Optimal Investment and Policy Issues 
 
With information asymmetry between the borrower and the creditor, 
optimality of investment becomes a crucial issue. We now 
investigate the  underinvestment and the  overinvestment problem 
occurring in the framework. With the bank and the firm both 
financing the project, the equilibrium net surplus in the system, 




* S p P + =  is  




* * * + - - - = 1 q                        (7) 
 
The net surplus is maximum when the project is funded at the least 
cost combination. This entails that the  expected auditing cost is zero 
and that the entire funding  is raised at the least per unit cost of   . r  
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The result regarding optimal investment level is 
 
Result 4: Under A.1 –A.2, the project will always be characterized 
by underinvestment. However, the extent of underinvestment is less 
if banks with higher auditing costs fund the project.  
Proof: Consider,  * X . Note that, from result 3,  * X  decreases as 
r increases. Therefeore, the  maximum  * X is attained at 
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0 . From the 















. This completes the proof.   
For the second part, note that  * X is increasing in  q  while  * Y is 
independent of  q .  
 
The first best level of investment involves- (i) no monitoring 
activities undertaken; and (ii) the entire funds raised should be at the 
least unit cost,  r . This is as if, the bank owns and alone funds the 
project.  When the bank invests along with the firm, then the apart 
from the q , the effective cost of capital per unit is more than r . This 
leads to underinvestment. However, as q  rises, the  bank curtails its 
investment, the firm curtails  R and therefore, she funds the project 
with more equity. The fall in bank financing is more than offset by 
the firms' contribution. Therefore, the aggregate investment exceeds 
the first best level. We also find that, while, lower auditing costs lead 
to a more severe problem of underinvestment. This observation is 
important. It supports the Gale Hellwig (1985) findings that costly 
state verification leads to underinvestment, higher auditing costs lead 
to overinvestment. However, it provides a rather counter intuitive but 
important insight to the problem. The bank curtails his investments. 
However, with higher per unit auditing costs, the bank attempt to 
avoid the expected auditing costs by reducing the probability of International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.2-2(2005) 
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default. Therefore, the percentage reduction in investment by the 
bank is less than the percentage increase in  q . Moreover, the firm 
also contributes more at the margin so that for the bank, investment 
continues to be lucrative. This leads to an increase in overall 
investment.  
 
We end the paper with the implications of these results on the 
optimal leverage ratio. As the investment by the bank and the firm 
can be solved in terms of the parameters of the model, the market 
value of debt equity ratio can be obtained in terms of the parameters 
alone. Define the market value of debt/equity as  X*B/X*F. 
 
Result 5:  The debt equity ratio decreases as (i) the auditing cost  
increases, or, (ii) the capital cost of the firm decreases, or, (iii) the 
capital cost of the bank increases. 
Proof: The proofs follow from comparing results obtained in 2 and 3.  
Intuitively, the results are as expected. Ceteris paribus, any increase 
in the  bank's cost reduces the  debt equity ratio as debt financing is 
increasingly substituted by equity funding. Also, an increase in the 
capital cost of the firm, substitutes equity by debt.  The  pattern 
leverage across economies suggests that the debt equity ratios reduce 
with the development of  financial markets. Similar findings are also 
reported in Demigurc and Levine (1996. The ratios are particularly 
high for those markets which are still `emerging financial markets', 
like the Scandinavian nations, India, Pakistan and Korea, in 
comparison to the already developed markets like UK, US, Canada 
etc. The high leverage ratios in Japan and FGR are often  attributed 
to their existing  banking structure. 
 
  Harris and Raviv (1990), conjectures that the leverage ratio is 
negatively related to investigation cost.  Our model justifies the 
above findings as well as supports  `country wise' findings of Borio 
(1990) We predict, a closer bank  - firm relationship would be 
reflected as higher leverage ratios. This is because, with banks 
having greater control over the firm, the auditing costs of the former 
will be lower inducing it to invest relatively more. 
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 In a study by Biais and Casamatta (1999), it is established that the  
optimal leverage ratio decreases with a worsening of the moral  
hazard problem.  Translated to our model,  a severe moral hazard 
problem due to strategic under reporting,  will be tackled by the bank 
by intensifying its monitoring activities.  This in turn would mean a 
higher monitoring cost. We predict that  the optimal leverage ratio is 
lower in such a case. In the most  recent work of Booth et al (2001), 
a negative relation is  established between agency cost of debt and 
the  debt to book  value ratio. They base their studies based on 
country wise comparisons. 
 
We empirically test the foundation of our model- the fact that 
increase in investment reduces probability of default. We test the 
model using a cross section of rural banks operating in India.
7 We 
have the data for 196 such banks during 2002 and 2003. The data 
available are on the variables Gross NPA (NPA) and Gross 
Advances (GRADV). The correlation coefficient between NPA(03) 
and NPA(02) is 0.98 while that between GRADV (02) and 
GRADV(03) is 0.99. With almost perfect OLS models.  
 
We estimate the following models: 
Model I:    NPA(03) = Constant + b GRADV(03) 
Model II:   NPA(03) = Constant + b GRADV(02) 
Model III:  INCPER = Constant + b INCGR. 
 
In the above, the variable INCPER is defined as incremental change 
in NPA as a total percentage of Gross Advances. INCGR similarly 
measures incremental percentage change in Gross Advances. 
Therefore, 
[ ] 100 * 1
) 02 ( GRADV
) 03 ( GRADV
INCGR ; 100 *
) 02 ( GRADV
) 02 ( NPA
) 03 ( GRADV





















Model III has interesting implications. It relates the incremental NPA 
percentage to change in advances. We report the findings below.  
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       Table1: Empirical Results 
  Model I  Model II  Model III 
  NPA(03)  NPA(03)  INCPER 












   








2  0.41  0.45  0.13 
Figures in the parantheses indicate the t-ratios. Variables with *** indicate 
significance at 99%.  
 
An important policy implication from the above result comes from 
the empirical relationship between the relationships of gross 
advances and percentage NPAs (Non Performing Assets) of various 
banks in India. The NPA (as percentage) of gross advances goes 
down as the gross advances increase. We consider regional rural 
banks as these banks are characterized by higher average transaction 
costs.  The findings are reported for Regional banks. With a direct 
relationship between probability of default and NPAs, this suggest 
that more investment by the bank increases the success probability. 
The policy implication that can be drawn from the above is, allowing 
banks with higher auditing costs, would not be inefficient. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
In this paper, we model the creditor - borrower relationship in a 
costly state verification framework. In order to prevent strategic 
default, auditing by the bank is done only in the default states. Our 
model differs from those in the literature with respect to the 
relationship between the funds raised and the expected profitability 
of the project. In our model, the amount of funds raised directly 
influences the success probability of the project. We empirically test Mukhopadhyay, B.          Theory of bank lending with monitoring and rural banking  
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the above using data of 196 regional rural banks. We establish that 
lower auditing costs may l ead to uderinvestment while higher 
auditing costs may lead to overinvestment. The overinvestment result 
may seen paradoxical, but is explained by the fact that inefficiency in 
bank lending, is more than offset by an increase in  equity. We also 
find that, while lending costs to the bank affects the debt equity ratio 
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